

An Assessment of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: From a civil society perspective March 2012

Executive Summary

Civil Society¹ went to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) calling for a *Busan Compact on Development Effectiveness* to put human rights and democratic ownership at the heart of global development. We recognise that the HLF4 ushered in a new era in the global effort to advance people's development needs and rights. Developments in the scope and membership of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (BPd) offer both opportunities and challenges for the future. Civil Society also acknowledges the greatly enhanced space created for formal civil society engagement in the HLF4 and subsequent processes.

This is Civil Society's assessment of the BPd against our CSO Key Messages and Proposals².

A: Fully evaluate and deepen the Paris and Accra commitments through reforms based on democratic ownership

Civil Society believes that the BPd does not adequately respond to the failure of all development actors – especially donors – to fully implement their commitments under the Paris Declaration (PD) and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). The absence of concrete timelines and targets for these is a cause for major concern, and must be redressed fully in the post-Busan accountability framework.

Civil Society welcomes the BPd's commitment 'to deepen, extend and operationalise the democratic ownership of development policies' and the reference to both country ownership and inclusive partnerships in the preamble. We remain highly concerned that the language on the private sector focuses too strongly on enabling its role: the private sector should also be made clearly accountable for a responsible contribution to development outcomes.

B: Strengthen development effectiveness through development cooperation practices that promote human rights standards and focus on the eradication of the causes of poverty and inequality.

Civil Society regrets that the underlying model of the BPd is private sector-led growth as the driver of development. The BPd makes only token reference to human rights as the basis of development, and its treatment of women's rights and the decent work agenda is weak.

C. Affirm and ensure the participation of the full diversity of CSOs as independent development actors in their own right.

Civil Society warmly welcomes the BPd's endorsement of the Istanbul Principles on CSO Development Effectiveness. We remain concerned that the BPd's commitment to create an enabling environment for CSOs does not create an accountability framework that will enable CSOs to fight back against government abuse of freedoms. Nor has there been any reproach for governments which fail to recognize the right of CSOs, as development actors in their own right, to fully participate in the decision making processes which determine whether development is sustainable and respects human rights.

D. Promote equitable and just development cooperation architecture.

The BPd deferred the most important decisions about the accountability framework for commitments made in Busan (and the PD/AAA) till June 2012. We believe that an equitable and inclusive governance structure and an ambitious monitoring framework with both global and country indicators are vital for ensuring that all actors indeed fulfil their commitments going forward.

¹ In this analysis the term Civil Society signifies the BetterAid Platform and the Open Forum Process and the CSO constituencies both entities represent.

² BetterAid/Open Forum, "CSOs on the Road to Busan: Key messages and proposals", April 2011, on-line at http://betteraid.org/en/member-downloads/doc_download/275-csoasks.html

I: Introduction

1. Civil Society went to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) calling for a *Busan Compact on Development Effectiveness* to put human rights and democratic ownership at the heart of global development. The HLF4 took place against the backdrop of a series of sustained and deep financial, food, fuel and climate crises which continue to afflict poor, vulnerable and marginalized populations the world over. Inequality remains a major problem to be addressed even in places of robust economic expansion. As policy-makers continue to wrestle with these crises, their recommendations remain at best misdirected and ineffectual, and at worst increase the burden on large parts of the world's population.

2. Busan also came at a time when many donors were either flat-lining or freezing their aid budgets. A focus on allocating resources where clear "value for money" in leveraging short term results is demonstrated, and catalyzing additional resources through private finance is changing the development landscape. The agreement struck at HLF-4, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (referred to as the BPd henceforth), offers opportunities and challenges to advancing how people's right to development is more effectively addressed and realized.

3. The task of agreeing to an HLF-4 outcome was an exercise into uncharted territory, as new actors, including key emerging economies, such as China and Brazil, and the private sector, participated for the first time in this process. Likewise, discussions moved beyond traditional modalities of development cooperation, incorporating South-South and Triangular cooperation, the role of the private sector in the context of aid and development, and climate financing. The agreement should be seen as a response to the need to move beyond a northern donor-driven arrangement to a new international framework that is more inclusive of the breadth of new players "in the tent", and the depth of new issues on the global development cooperation policy agenda. This process has not been without compromise. The inclusion of a broader set of players, though not fully inclusive of all developing country perspectives, meant a much shallower outcome on a range of issues.

4. The agreement that was accepted in Busan offers positive outcomes as well. For example, the BPd has made progress relative to Accra in many areas crucial to civil society. The BPd has moved the agenda beyond aid effectiveness to address development effectiveness ("effective development"). The new partnership shifts the focus from a technical aid effectiveness agenda towards a new development effectiveness agenda that is more inclusive, more political, and focused on results as development outcomes rather than simply as results of aid delivery. For the first time, democratic ownership – a key tenet of development effectiveness – has been acknowledged as fundamental principle of development cooperation implemented through inclusive partnerships.

5. The agreement has also confirmed key spaces for greater civil society involvement in development decisions and processes. While Accra saw increased involvement of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) at the HLF, Busan went further by including Civil Society in the negotiation process. Having a seat at the table has meant the formal recognition of the independent role civil society plays in the development process. The BPd also acknowledges the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness. This, along with the reaffirmation of civil society's role, are both warmly welcomed, especially in the context of significantly reduced political and operational space for CSOs in a growing number of countries worldwide. Nevertheless, limiting civil society representation to a single interlocutor presented a monumental challenge in terms of meeting the demands of the negotiation process and responding to and capturing the diverse and complex positions of CSOs from different regions and sectors across the world. As a result, CSOs will push for an expanded presence in the Global Partnership through representation that better reflects our diversity.

6. Finally, the Busan Partnership has created a new global governance framework, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (referred to as the Global Partnership henceforth), which will succeed the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF). This Global Partnership hopefully will move the development agenda towards a broader framework that is more inclusive, involving not only the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, but also the United Nations Development Program, South-South Cooperation actors, parliamentarians and local authorities, civil society and the private sector. The Global Partnership should be democratic, inclusive and accountable to all countries and stakeholders. It should be rooted in internationally agreed development goals, norms and conventions and thus reflect a rights based approach to development.

II: Post-Busan roundup

7. The analysis that follows provides a balanced critique of the BPd, recognizing both the positive and negative elements, as measured against our CSO Key Messages and Proposals.³

Key Ask 1: Fully evaluate and deepen Paris and Accra commitments

1.1 Redress the failure to make progress on Paris and Accra

8. Government and civil society monitoring of progress on the Paris Declaration (PD)⁴ has clearly demonstrated that the Paris Process has failed to deliver on its promise of better aid. These evaluations have indicated that while the process has helped improve how aid is delivered, insufficient donor will has hampered implementation of the PD and its follow-up agreement, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). Developing countries have fared better at meeting many of their commitments, such as putting in place sound national development strategies and in some cases national results frameworks. However looking at the spectrum of country advances suggests, as the OECD 2011 monitoring survey signals, that “progress has been uneven and neither fast nor far-reaching enough” (§6).

9. There is still a long way to go in fulfilling the PD and AAA. There is an urgent need to strengthen and deepen the implementation of these commitments going forward. Unfortunately, the BPd seems to take these commitments for granted and fails to adequately address the unfinished business of Paris and Accra. While the document re-commits those that endorsed the PD and the AAA, it does so in the absence of any concrete timelines or targets, thus leaving those commitments open-ended. Going forward, it will be essential to develop clear and inclusive accountability frameworks as part of the Global Partnership. This will allow for global and national monitoring not only of the commitments made in Busan but, more importantly, those set out in Paris and Accra. (See more below on this.)

10. Realizing the commitments made in Busan is essential for implementing the four principles that are core to the agreement: ownership, results, inclusive partnerships, and transparency and accountability. These four principles help to take Busan beyond what was pledged in Paris and Accra. They “form the foundation for our co-operation for effective development”, apply to all development actors, and are “consistent with our agreed international commitments on human rights, decent work, gender equality, environmental sustainability and disability” (§11).

11. Despite the core role that these principles play in this agreement, one must recognize that the BPd is completely voluntary. Moreover, the agreement’s text which explicitly notes the voluntary nature of the relevant principles, commitments and actions as they relate to South-South Cooperation must be seen as the biggest concession made in the negotiations. Such a reference is truly damaging to the spirit of the document and ultimately challenges the sincerity with which some new actors are truly engaged in this partnership.

1.2 Strengthen Paris and Accra

1.2.1 Put democratic ownership at the core of development effectiveness

12. Civil Society sought to promote meaningful democratic ownership of development policies, planning and actions through full engagement with, and accountability to, all development stakeholders. While democratic ownership was not included as one of the foundational principles (§11) of development cooperation, it was included as a key action to meet them. Yet the inability to place democratic ownership at the centre of the BPd can be seen as one of Civil Society’s main goals for Busan that went unachieved.

³ BetterAid, “CSOs on the Road to Busan: Key messages and proposals”, April 2011, on-line at http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/cso_asks_final_.pdf

⁴ The surveys referred to are the OECD Monitoring the Paris Declaration, the independent Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Reality of Aid Special Report on civil society perspectives on progress since Paris. See: OECD, “2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration”, on-line at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/30/48742718.pdf>; Danish Institute for International Studies, “Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration”, May 2011, on-line at <http://pd-website.inforce.dk/content/content-en.html>; Reality of Aid, “Democratic ownership and development effectiveness: Perspectives on progress since Paris”, September 2011, on-line at <http://www.realityofaid.org/roa-reports/index/secid/379/Democratic-Ownership-and-Development-Effectiveness-Civil-Society-Perspectives-on-Progress-since-Paris>

13. Civil Society recognizes that it will need to continue to affirm the place of CSOs in “shaping development policies and partnerships” (§22) as part of a truly democratic and inclusive process. The language around the New Deal on post-conflict countries and fragile states is a stark reminder that democratic ownership must at the heart of all related initiatives. Unfortunately, the New Deal ignores the importance of state-society relations and does not present a way forward for monitoring and advocating for strong citizen participation.

1.2.2 Give priority to multi-stakeholder policy dialogue

14. Similarly, there is no direct reference to inclusive and multi-stakeholder policy dialogue in the BPd principles. However, the text does include the reference (§12) that the four Busan principles will guide actions “to deepen, extend and operationalise democratic ownership of development policies and processes”. This denotes national development plans, policies and processes anchored primarily on citizens’ voices and concerns. This is a crucial acknowledgement. The monitoring of the PD and AAA commitments has shown that there has been little improvement in the systematic inclusion of peoples’ organizations and voices in determining and reviewing development priorities at the country level.⁵

1.2.3 Country systems as the first option

15. In looking at the BPd, progress on the use of country systems as the first option can be considered mixed at best. When compared to the AAA, the BPd offers slightly stronger language on the use of country systems. While Accra referred to using country systems as the first option, it also immediately gave donors the opportunity to opt out of doing so. Instead, Busan has made the use of country systems the default option (§19). However, the BPd also notes that this must be done while still “respecting the governance structures of both the provider of development cooperation and the developing country”. In this sense, the BPd takes one step forward, one step back.

1.2.4 End policy conditionality

16. There is a notable regression in the BPd, as compared to the Paris and Accra commitments, with respect to donor commitments to reduce or ultimately eliminate conditionality. Civil Society has long advocated for an end to policy conditionality. It is disappointing to see that development actors cannot achieve a consensus on eliminating such policy obligations in the provision of aid.

1.2.5 Untie all forms of aid

17. In Busan, it was disheartening to not achieve further progress to untie all aid. Some donors essentially blocked efforts by developing countries to include a commitment in the agreement to fully untie aid by 2013. The BPd only pledges to accelerate efforts achieved in Accra, to improve the quality and transparency of reporting on this, and to review plans to go further in 2012. Although an emphasis on local procurement could have helped to counter balance this position, there was limited related text included in the BPd. Only one reference is made to local procurement – and only in the context of relating what untying aid can bring. There are also no firm commitments to proactively pursue smart and local procurement.

1.2.6 Demand driven technical assistance

18. The BPd does not include specific commitments on the provision of demand-driven technical assistance. Only through the text on effective institutions does the issue of demand for technical assistance enter into the document. For example, there is reference to “assess[ing] country institutions, systems and capacity development needs, led by developing countries,” (§29(b)).

1.2.7 Unpredictable aid flows

19. Much like the language on untying aid, the BPd does not go beyond Accra in terms of aid predictability. The BPd recommits donors to make available, regular, timely rolling three to five year indicative forward expenditures and/or implementation plans. While this was also agreed as a commitment in Accra, few donors have provided these plans

20. It is also worth noting that at the HLF-4 governments accepted that fragmentation remains an area where progress has been limited. This will only become more important with the new range of players that are increasingly active in the development arena, including providers of South-South Cooperation and private

Both the *Reality of Aid 2011 Global Report* and the official evaluations of the *Paris Declaration* have noted limited progress. See: Reality of Aid (2011), *Democratic Ownership and Development Effectiveness: Civil Society Perspectives on Progress since Paris*, Reality of Aid 2011 Report, October 2011, accessible at www.realityofaid.org.

foundations. Civil Society acknowledges that diversity must be valued and protected but no effort can be spared to maximize impact and reduce transaction cost. The BPD in §25 addresses diversity and fragmentation by setting commitments including:

- 1) “greater use of country-led co-ordination”, including division of labour, PBAs, joint programming and delegated cooperation (by 2013);
- 2) “agree on principles and guidelines” to guide joint efforts in reducing the proliferation of multilateral and global fund and programme channels. (by end 2012);
- 3) “agreeing on principles” to address issue of countries that receive insufficient assistance. (by end 2012);
- 4) “review” delegation of authority to the field and deepen and accelerate efforts to address insufficient delegation.

Even if these propositions mark some progress relative to Paris and Accra, Civil Society is concerned that these commitments may not succeed in reducing fragmentation in the absence of a global mechanism that can support their implementation.

1.2.8 Private sector development for self-sustaining livelihoods

21. The BPD provides for key language on the private sector that articulates their “central role ... in advancing innovation, creating wealth, income and jobs, mobilizing domestic resources and in turn contributing to poverty reduction” [§32]. The private sector clearly does have a role to play in development. But it is wrong to assume that the private sector will contribute to poverty reduction and positive and equitable development outcomes. Aid for the private sector must demonstrate clear financial and development additionality and make poverty eradication the core focus of private sector partners.

22. The BPD also commits to creating a robust enabling environment for the private sector, including foreign direct investment and public-private partnerships (§32(a)). Again, it is not a question of creating an enabling environment, but rather a question of ensuring that the private sector contributes to positive development outcomes. This can be done by creating capacity amongst partner countries to implement effective taxation and regulatory frameworks.

23. Finally, the private sector has no such principles as civil society has to guide its engagement. The failure to specify a framework based on internationally agreed standards⁶ is major omission in the text on the private sector. Going forward, the Global Partnership must develop a multi-stakeholder process to establish a comprehensive vision and policy framework to hold business to be accountable and transparent in terms of development effectiveness principles.

1.3 Implement full transparency as the basis for strengthened accountability and good governance

1.3.1 Clear inclusive accountability frameworks at country and global levels

24. The Post-Busan Interim Group, and ultimately the Global Partnership, must develop a robust – but manageable – monitoring framework with a relevant set of core indicators. These indicators, in addition to voluntary ones, must generate the necessary political incentives for all development actors to implement their promises made in Paris and Accra, and the commitments set out in Busan.⁷ The framework should not monitor anything less than the original commitments agreed in Paris. Such a framework for Busan is critical to achieving progress in country-level monitoring and accountability. It will provide partner countries with a strong basis from which to identify local-level donor monitoring priorities and to leverage agreement on an ambitious agenda for taking them forward. Without such a change, Civil Society is concerned that the monitoring system will not draw on lessons learned from past monitoring activities nor provide for deeper democratic accountability.

1.3.2 Highest standards of openness and transparency applicable to all aid actors

25. Transparency was one of the big winners coming out of Busan. Transparency and accountability are

⁶ For more information on standards, see: the International Labour Organisations’ (ILO) labour standards, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines on multi-national enterprises and the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights.

⁷ Accountability must not be based on a new OECD monitoring system and should go beyond measuring outputs (aid delivered) to examine the level of outcomes (results). Improve aid and development cooperation monitoring systems by building on and improving the existing country or regionally relevant indicators and accountability mechanisms, such as: MDG targets and indicators, CEDAW reporting requirements, reporting on the BPfA, the ICPD, and other international mechanisms such as the Human Rights Council UPR. #

included as guiding principles for the overall agreement and included in the preamble (§ 11d). The BPd laid out language and timelines for adopting a common transparency standard (§ 23c), which are some of the only date-specific text in the document. The BPd states the pledge by December 2015 to “implement a common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on resources provided through development cooperation”. In practice, an increased number of governments also signed on to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) ahead of and at Busan.

26. There is an explicit link made between transparency and accountability and other areas in the text. This includes language on corruption, stating there is a zero-tolerance policy (§ 33a) and government will intensify efforts to implement the international agreements to fight corruption and illicit flows (§ 33).

27. However, this text was hard fought and only achieved through constant advocacy and pressure on governments to recognize their past commitments in these areas. There are also some shortfalls that entered into the negotiation process. The “country heavy” emphasis in the BPd has implicitly shifted the burden of engagement on transparency from the donors and their development practices (as recognized in the PD and AAA) towards countries. Moreover, limited advances were made on making data not just open but more meaningful through its disaggregation. For example, the same commitment from the AAA on providing for gender disaggregated data was restated in the BPd.

Key Ask 2. Strengthen development effectiveness through practices based on human rights standards

2.1 Commit to and strengthen rights-based approaches to development

28. CSOs insist that international rights, norms and standards be at the centre of development effectiveness. This means paying attention to non-discrimination, due diligence, participation and empowerment, the interdependence of rights and democratic ownership. The BPd gives a powerful endorsement of civil society, and importantly acknowledges that CSOs, “play a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights [and] in promoting rights-based approaches [to development]” (§ 22). In this respect, there is a clear reference to rights-based approaches to development, which on the surface would appear to be a positive advance on this front for civil society. Sadly, however, the inclusion is bittersweet. The task of ensuring rights-based approaches is not one for CSOs alone—it requires commitment from all stakeholders in development. So, while we welcome the inclusion of rights-based approaches in the BPd, we are truly disappointed with the references limitation to CSOs only.

29. However, while the BPd also puts “our agreed international commitments on human rights, decent work, gender equality, environmental sustainability and disability” at the heart of development cooperation (§11), it makes few other references to human rights. In sum, the agreement falls short of promoting a binding set of commitments that enhances the right to development and that adequately responds to the needs of all people living in poverty. In contrast, it clearly favours a vision of development “driven by strong, sustainable and inclusive growth” (§28a). As Civil Society we believe the emphasis placed on an inclusive growth framework is incapable of addressing the challenges with which we are presented and will no doubt fail to deliver development outcomes that reach all segments of society. This is an essential and unacceptable flaw in the agreement.

2.2 Promote and implement gender equality and women’s rights

30. Civil Society welcomes the inclusion of a full paragraph (§20) on gender equality and women’s empowerment in the BPd. However, references to gender equality are not integrated throughout the document and to women’s rights are non-existent. Furthermore, §20 only seeks to reduce gender inequality rather than to end it; it makes no concrete time-bound commitments to advance gender equality and women’s rights; and, it makes no pledges to ensure that donor and government financing specifically supports the attainment of gender equality and women’s rights.

31. The agreement also fails to mention the important role that women and women’s rights organizations play in all decision-making processes to focus on women’s equal political participation in development, policy-making and standard-setting. Women, feminists, women’s organizations and women movements play key roles in development at all levels and the full realization of women’s rights as human rights are essential to any development and to any development cooperation framework. To this end, women’s economic

empowerment – alongside their social and political empowerment – is an inalienable right, not a “prerequisite for sustainable and inclusive growth”.

2.3 Implement the decent work agenda as the cornerstone of socially inclusive and sustainable development strategies

32. The BPd acknowledges that decent work in the context of growth is “paramount” (§3) to address the “central challenge(s)” of “poverty and inequality”. Along with human rights and gender equality, decent work (and social protection (§8)) is seen as an integral element of effective development cooperation (§11). This broadens the commitments made in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) and Paris Declaration for respecting the international agreements on human rights, gender equality and environmental sustainability.

33. Still, the underlying agenda of the BPd, as noted earlier, relies on growth as the driver of development. In response, we regret the limited role for the state, primarily seen as the enabler of market and private sector driven policies, and in turn the lack of attention to job creation, local and sustainable entrepreneurship and public sector driven strategies. The BPd also fails to recognise trade unions as key players in their own right and as a social partner in development.

Key Ask 3: Support CSOs as independent development actors in their own right, and commit to an enabling environment for their work in all countries

3.1 Endorse the Istanbul Principles and acknowledge the International Framework

34. While language in the BPd falls short of endorsement, the acknowledgement of both the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness (§22(b)), coupled with public endorsement by both the South Korean hosts and the US government, among others, was clearly a strong victory for civil society in Busan.

3.2 Agree on minimum standards for government and donor policies, laws regulations and practices that create an enabling environment

35. Success on the enabling environment offers a mixed result. Governments have agreed to implement an enabling environment “consistent with agreed international rights” (§22(b)). This is positive in that it reaffirms existing human rights obligations.

36. However, we feel quite strongly that the strength of this idea is lost in the absence of explicit language articulating a minimum set of standards for governments and donors in terms of their policies, laws and regulations, which CSOs had been demanding. These include the right to freedom of Association, Assembly, Expression, as well as recognition of our freedom to operate freely from unwarranted state interference, freedom to fundraise and most importantly the states’ duty to protect. The failure to specify the fundamental elements of the enabling environment for civil society, in addition to a global trend of shrinking space for civil society, is serious cause for concern as it creates room for abuse by governments.

Key Ask 4: Promote equitable and just development cooperation architecture

4.1 Launch an inclusive Busan Compact on HLF4, which brings together specific time-bound commitments and initiates fundamental reforms in global governance

37. Civil Society acknowledges that the BPd reflects broadly the need to inject into the future governance of aid and development cooperation new and evolving elements, from the role of the emerging economies, to enhancing partner country leadership in developing strategies, to the role of CSOs. At the same time, Civil Society feels compelled to underline that the BPd falls short of asserting the fundamental features that the new governance should exhibit in order to realize the new development reality. On the contrary, in §36 it refers to “light working arrangements for this Global Partnership”, which is a source of concern inasmuch as several critical areas remain unclear—namely, to what extent donors will invest in the implementation and monitoring process and the level of support that partner countries will receive to fulfil leadership. The building of the Global Partnership is business to be finished by June 2012 and Civil Society remains committed to ensuring that the promise to create a space that is “new, inclusive and representative” is fulfilled.

4.2 Create an equitable and inclusive multilateral forum for policy dialogue and standard setting

38. The Post Busan Interim Group (PBIG) is currently in the process of establishing a governance framework

to guide Global Partnership, will be responsible for carrying forward commitments made in the BPd. In this regard, it is too early to determine whether the future governance structure for this agenda meets the demands⁸ set out by civil society.

39. Civil Society is keen at this point in the process to reiterate that the successor of the Working Party should be built upon the following six principles:

- 1) be human rights based and informed by the responsibility and accountability of all countries/stakeholders to internationally agreed development goals, norms and conventions;
- 2) be a forum that is inclusive, transparent, legitimate through membership of all development actors, with full representation of all developing country perspectives;
- 3) be a democratic space to hold aid and development effectiveness discussions, where decisions are taken with full accountability;
- 4) supports a monitoring process that measures progress toward fulfilling Paris, Accra and Busan commitments;
- 5) makes provision for the inclusion with full participatory rights for non-state actors and maintains the role of CSOs as independent development actors in their own right;
- 6) ensures accountability for all commitments made by all countries/stakeholders involved in development cooperation.

III: Conclusion and ways forward

40. CSOs recognize positive elements in the Busan Partnership Agreement, but are also very concerned by the risks, or worse still threats, contained within the document, that have the potential to seriously undermine development efforts. In this light, CSOs intend to maintain their role in any and all future processes that emerge as outcomes from Busan to ensure that the positive aspects of the agreement are upheld, and the risks are addressed and overcome.

41. The hard work of shaping a new and just framework for development cooperation by constructing specific targets, core indicators and time-bound monitoring mechanisms, which reflect 'common but differentiated' responsibilities and right based approaches, are challenges we are eager to contribute to in the coming four months. Just as in the next four years, we will continue to fight for development that promotes sustainable change, within a democratic framework, and that addresses the causes as well as the symptoms of poverty, gender and social inequality and marginalization, through the diversity and complementarity of instruments, policies and actors.

42. We close by saying that a focus at the country level in terms of implementation, outcomes and assessment is paramount. As the Global Partnership takes shape and the future governance of the development effectiveness agenda emerges we must ensure a focus on country level implementation that maintains as its core tenets human rights, gender equality, social justice, decent work and environmental sustainability.

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⁸ Please refer to BetterAid, "Making development cooperation architecture just: Governance principles and pillars", Discussion Note, March 2011, on-line at <http://www.betteraid.org/en/betteraid-policy/betteraid-publications/policy-papers/401-making-development-cooperation-just-governance-principles-and-pillars.html>